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ABSTRACT
Between 1890 and 2004, total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the United States
has been strongly procyclical, while labor productivity growth has been mildly so. This
chapter argues that these results are not simply a statistical artifact, as Mathew Shapiro
and others have argued. Procyclicality results principally from demand shocks
interacting with capital services which are relatively invariant over the cycle. This
account contrasts with that offered by the real business cycle (RBC) program, which
attributes economic cycles to technology shocks as measured by deviations in TFP from
trend.

Introduction
Between 1890 and 2004, total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the United
States has been strongly procyclical, while labor productivity growth has been mildly
so. The paper argues that these results are not simply a statistical artifact, as Mathew
Shapiro and others have argued. Procyclicality results principally from demand
shocks interacting with capital services which are relatively invariant over the cycle.
This account contrasts with that offered by the real business cycle (RBC) program,
which attributes economic cycles to technology shocks as measured by deviations in
TFP from trend. In real business cycle models causality runs entirely from the side of
aggregate supply.
The difficulty with the RBC approach is that TFP does not just experience
retardation in its growth rate during recessions. It declines. TFP not only declined
between 1929 and 1933, it has declined during almost every economic downturn
since 1890. There are conceivably adverse supply shocks that could account for this,
although such events are historically quite unusual. Since the statistical results
themselves cannot ultimately tell us which process is producing such declines,
narrative history, at its best integrating the analysis of qualitative and quantitative
data, plays a critical role in efforts to persuade that one or the other of these
explanatory frameworks is preferable. The challenge for RBC proponents is to
provide plausible accounts for why TFP declines in most downturns.
1. The Evidence for Procyclical TFP
In several papers I have documented the high rate of TFP growth across the
Depression years and considered its causes and implications for understanding US

economic growth in this and other periods (Field, 2003, 2006a,b, 2007b, 2009a). A
byproduct of this work has been the finding that total factor productivity growth was
strongly procyclical during the Depression years (Field, 2008). When the
unemployment rate went up, the level of TFP went down, and vice versa. How
generalizable is the phenomenon of Depression era TFP procyclicality? The answer
is striking. Similar regression analyses show that for over a century TFP growth in
the United States has been strongly procyclical. The elasticity of TFP growth with
respect to a change in the unemployment rate has been remarkably stable in the years
both before and after the Second World War and in a variety of subperiods during
which trend growth rates of TFP were quite different.1
The evidence for the persistence of procyclical TFP and the stability of its
empirical significance comes from a series of regressions of the change in the natural
log of TFP (∆TFP) on the change in the unemployment rate in percentage points
(∆UR):
∆TFP = α + β ∆UR + µ
The estimated constant term in the equation (α ) can be interpreted as an
estimate of the trend growth rate of TFP over the period studied. The coefficient (β)
describes the relationship between the TFP growth rate and the change in the
unemployment rate, and is thus a measure of cyclicality.
The regressions reported in Table 1 have two striking features. First, the
coefficients on the change in the unemployment rate all lie within a tight range
bounded by -.83 for the post-World War II era (equation 1.8) and -1.03 for the entire
period from 1890 to 2004 (equation 1.10).2 Over more than a century TFP was

strongly procyclical and in a remarkably consistent fashion: a fall in the
unemployment rate by one percentage point led to an increase in the growth rate of
TFP of about 0.9 percent per year. The strong procyclical relationship holds across
all time periods, even the World War II years, despite the fact that nearly half of all
production went to the military and there were shortages and rationing in the civilian
sector (Higgs, 1992). The size of the procyclicality coefficient does not depend on
whether one is close to potential output or substantially below it. A comparison of
Equations 1.10 and 1.11 shows that inclusion of the level of unemployment (UR),
along with its rate of change (∆UR) has little effect on the originally estimated
coefficient.
These equations provide the empirical grounds for concluding that procyclical
TFP growth has been a persisting characteristic of the US economy for over a century
and that the magnitude of the cyclicality effect has been relatively stable. It is
striking that the estimates pre- and post- World War II are so similar. Although
Kendrick felt comfortable publishing annual TFP estimates, Kuznets worried about
the use of his early national income estimates for cyclical analysis, primarily because
of unease about the inventory investment series he had constructed.3 There are many
ways in which inaccurate data might lead to spurious conclusions. But if the process
producing short run procyclicality was similar pre- and postwar, and if there was
simply more noise in the prewar data, we might have expected the estimated prewar
relationship to be weaker. It is not.
The second striking feature of Table 1 is substantial variation in growth rates
across different historical epochs, a finding common in the work of pioneers in the

study of TFP growth rates such as Abramovitz (1956). The trend growth rates
represented by the estimates of the constant term vary from a low of 0.53 percent per
year during the dismal age from 1973 to 1995 (equation 1.7) to 1.95 during the
golden era from 1948 to 1973 (equation 1.6) to a high of 2.83 percent per year in the
Depression years from 1929 to 1941 (equation 1.1).
Running separate regressions across different subperiods whose demarcations
reflect judgment contrasts with the ahistorical and mechanical use of the HodrickPrescott filter in real business cycle studies. Kehoe and Prescott (2008, pp. 9-10), for
example, “view the increase in the stock of useful knowledge … as exogenous. Our
view is that this stock increases smoothly over time and is not country-specific.”4
The variation in trend growth rates identified in these different regressions is
consistent with a contrasting view that the arrival of economically important
innovations may be quite discontinuous, and cluster in particular epochs, rendering
some periods more technologically progressive than others.
2. Procyclicality in TFP and Output per Hour
Interest in the procyclicality of TFP, as opposed to other measures of
productivity, like output per labor hour, is recent.5 Since the 1960s and the work of
Hultgren (1960), Eckstein and Wilson (1964), and Kuh (1965), however, empirical
macroeconomists have taken it as a stylized fact that the growth of labor productivity
is procyclical:6 the growth rate of output per hour (like TFP) is negatively related to
changes in the unemployment rate. The majority of these studies deal with data from
manufacturing, but Gordon (1979; 1993, p. 275) makes the claim more generally for
the private nonfarm economy.

Table 2 explores the cyclicality of output per hour and related measures as well
as their long run growth paths. Its regressions replace the TFP growth rate in Table 1
with other dependent variables, including the growth rates of output per hour, the
capital/labor ratio, hours, capital, output per unit of capital, and total output. The
results show first (equations 2.1-2.4) that although output per hour, like TFP, is
procyclical, the relationship between its growth rate and the change in the
unemployment rate is weaker, and for the period after 1973 (equation 2.3), one cannot
reject the hypothesis of acyclicality. In an arithmetic sense, the procyclicality of
labor productivity is due to the fact that the response of output to a change in the
unemployment rate (equations 2.18-20) is stronger than the response of hours
(equations 2.9-11).
Whereas both output and hours change systematically with a change in the
unemployment rate, the coefficient in the capital growth rate equation is so small that
the growth rate in capital appears to be acyclical (equations 2.12.-14). Why? There
are substantial lead times in acquiring some types of producer durables (aircraft, for
example) as well as virtually all categories of structures (factories, warehouses,
houses, and any type of infrastructure). These long gestation periods, in which
projects are completed in an uncertain future and where the strength of aggregate
demand down the road can only be guessed at the time the projects are begun, is part
of the explanation. It is true that optimism in expansions tends to boost planned
investment, but central banks often attempt to lean against the wind by raising interest
rates and dampening enthusiasm.

Cyclical fluctuations in the cost of materials and

availability of construction labor can also make recessions attractive times in which to

initiate expensive projects, and curb them during booms. That said, there is a slight
negative correlation between the unemployment rate and an index of gross private
investment spending, but it is too weak to influence the overall acyclicality of the
capital stock numbers, from which our estimates of service flow are drawn (see
Section 3).7
The acyclicality of capital combined with the procylicality of hours means that
during expansions, labor hours grow more than capital, so that the capital-labor ratio
is countercyclical (equations 2.5-8). If the capital labor ratio were all that changed in
an expansion, its decline should cause the marginal product of labor to fall.8 This
effect operating in isolation would mean that output per hour should fall as the
unemployment rate falls. Since the results in Equations 2.1 through 2.4 in Table 2
show the opposite, some other factor must be counterbalancing the fall in the
capital/labor ratio in an expansion.
Labor hoarding is the most common explanation for why labor productivity
rises with declines in unemployment (see, e.g. Hall, 1988, p. 929). As Christina
Romer puts it, “Firms tend to be slow to fire workers in bad years and slow to hire
workers in good years” (1986, p. 6). Because of fixed costs associated with turnover
and hiring, firms retain labor during downturns and seek increased work intensity per
man hour during upturns. The rise in intensity of work is not initially reflected by
increases in employment or hours, and the consequence is that output rises more
rapidly than hours as unemployment declines.
The dynamics of employment, hours, and output are, however, more complex
than the labor hoarding story suggests. During the postwar period, for example,

firms typically completed the more intensive exploitation of already hired labor well
before the end of an expansion. In the last one or two years before a peak, they
tended to hire additional workers at a rapid rate.

Robert Gordon (1979, 1993)

suggests that this “end-of-expansion” effect slows growth in output per hour and
attenuates the overall pro-cyclicality of labor productivity. Since the growth of capital
is acyclical, the end-of-expansion effect causes the capital-labor ratio to decline as
one completes recovery from recession. The resulting downward pressure on the
marginal product of labor helps explain why the procyclicality of output per hour is
weaker than that of TFP.
The competing roles of TFP growth and capital shallowing in influencing the
cyclicality of output per hour can be illustrated using the Solow growth accounting
framework, often used to decompose the growth rate in output per hour (y – n) in the
long run into the sum of the TFP growth rate (a) plus capital’s share (β) times the
growth rate in the capital/labor ratio ((k – n):
y – n = α + β (k – n)
The equation can also be used to explore the influences on the cyclicality of
growth in output per hour by differentiating with respect to a change in the
unemployment rate. Tables 1 and 2 establish empirically the signs of the relevant
relationships. First, d(y-n)/d(UR) is negative – when the unemployment rate declines,
the rate of growth of output per hour rises. Second, dα/d(UR) is negative – when the
unemployment rate declines, the TFP growth rate rises (Table 1) Finally, d(β (k –
n))/d(UR) is positive: when the unemployment rate declines, the growth rate of the
capital labor ratio declines (I ignore here any cyclical influences on capital’s share).

When the unemployment rate falls as the economy comes out of recession, the
fall in the capital labor ratio tends to reduce growth in output per hour while
procyclical TFP advance tends to increase it. During the period 1890-2004, for
example, reductions in the unemployment rate by one percent were associated with
increases of 0.5 percent in the growth rate of output per man hour (equation 2.4).
This is a slower rate than the average TFP rise of 0.83 percent associated with a one
percent decline in the unemployment rate. Assuming that the capital share (β) is
0.22, the decomposition suggests that this difference is driven by a fall in the growth
rate of the capital/labor ratio of 1.5 percent per year (equation 2.8). Thus for each
percentage point decline in the unemployment rate the TFP growth rate rises by .83
percentage points per year, but the growth rate of output per hour increases by this
amount less an offset of .33 (.22*1.5) due to capital shallowing. It is the strong
procyclicality of TFP that keeps labor productivity growth mildly procyclical
The argument advanced here is that labor productivity and TFP are both
procyclical because of the inability of the private business sector to get rid of capital
in a downturn. Unlike labor, capital can’t be fired. It must be held by someone, who
incurs real holding costs, and real depreciation costs largely unaffected by utilization.
This involuntary “hoarding” of capital is thus more important than the voluntary
hoarding of labor in explaining procyclicality in TFP and any tendency in that
direction for labor productivity.
Not only are the costs of holding existing capital unavoidable, but for most asset
categories, total user cost is largely independent of how intensively the stock is used.
The capital costs of a warehouse, hotel, or an airplane, for example, do not depend

much on how full each is.9 As a result, as unemployment declines, the average cost
of capital declines because utilization-invariant depreciation charges and the largely
fixed costs of holding capital are spread over a larger flow volume of output. The
productivity dual of these cost reductions is that total factor productivity increases.
Meanwhile, the effect on output per hour in the aggregate is closer to a wash because
the rise in TFP is partially offset by the effect on output per hour of the reduction in
the capital-labor ratio as one approaches potential output from below.
3. A Statistical Artifact?
Is TFP procyclicality a statistical artifact due to the failure to make a cyclical
adjustment to capital input? In all of these calculations capital services are proxied by
estimates of its stock. Beginning with Solow (1957), a number of economists have
attempted to make a utilization adjustment for capital when calculating TFP. Solow
used the unemployment rate for labor as a proxy. The magnitude of such an
adjustment may not make much difference if one is interested in long term growth,
but it can make a big difference if one is concerned with the cyclicality of
productivity. In particular, if the cyclical adjustment to capital input is large enough
it will reduce or even eliminate the finding of procyclicality.
Mathew Shapiro (1993), for example, used unpublished data on hours per day
and days per week of plant operation to adjust capital input in manufacturing. After
the adjustment, the procyclicality of measured manufacturing TFP over the period
1978-88 disappears. The result is not surprising, since reducing capital input in
recessions, when facilities are operated less intensively, will raise calculated TFP
levels in troughs.10 But such adjustments are too large. If any adjustment is

warranted, it is in the aggregate small, and treating the service flow as proportional to
capital stock will probably give a better first approximation of economically
meaningful capital input than the adjusted series suggested by Solow or Shapiro.
It is important to understand why cyclical adjustments such as those made by
Solow or Shapiro are too large. In a non-slave economy, capital and labor are not on
an equal footing in terms of the options available to business owners in the event of a
downturn. Firms may choose, but are not required, to hoard labor. Insofar as capital
is concerned, the private business sector is in the same position as were antebellum
southern plantation owners with respect to their field hands. The private business
sector must hold existing capital irrespective of the stage of the business cycle. It
can, in principle, adjust the rate of accessioning, but for a variety of reasons,
including lead times, the estimates in Table 2 show that the growth rate of the capital
stock is basically acyclical.
This acyclicality would be less relevant here if the aggregate cost of capital
fluctuated proportionately with utilization. But it does not, because the
preponderance of the user cost of capital is unaffected by utilization. That proportion
varies by asset category, but is particularly high for structures, such as warehouses,
factory buildings, commercial and retail office structures, hotels and apartment
buildings, railway permanent way, pipelines, telephone landlines and microwave
installations, and fiber optic cable.11 It should be noted that structures account for a
large majority of capital assets in the economy. Since 1925, the first year for which
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides Fixed Asset data, the value of

structures has never fallen below 80 percent of the value of fixed assets (see Field,
2009b).
The majority of the user cost of capital is unaffected by utilitization for other
asset classes, as well, including producer durables in the transportation sector, such as
aircraft, railroad rolling stock, busses, and barges. Even for producer durables for
which depreciation is a larger portion of the user cost, decisions about when the asset
has been fully depreciated are largely unrelated to utilization for many assets. This is
particularly true for items like computers, cellular telephones and software, where
technological obsolescence is far more important than how many hours of operation
the equipment has experienced.
In the case of durables such as aircraft or vehicles, it is true that depreciation
will rise with operating hours or miles. But the relevant output or scale variable is
passenger or ton-miles, not simply miles. In an airline system, for example, much of
the increase in passenger miles as one comes out of recession is accommodated by a
rise in load factors, not an increase in aircraft operating hours. Consequently, the rise
in output as one approaches potential will have little effect on aggregate capital costs.
The situation is even more dramatic for structures, such as hotels, apartments,
warehouses, or retail and commercial office buildings. The user cost of the
warehouse or the hotel is largely the same whether it is full or half empty. We can
attribute the reductions in unit costs as the output gap closes to economies of scale,
provided we recognize that we are indexing scale to output (cubic meters of goods
stored, or moved per year), not to a combined input measure.

Ignoring the possible effect of capital gains and losses, we can, following
Jorgenson, characterize the annual user cost of capital C as the capital stock K times
the sum of the interest rate r and the rate of depreciation δ.
C = (r + δ)K
User costs are therefore the sum of rK, the pure cost of holding physical capital, and
δΚ, depreciation costs. The first term is entirely unaffected by utilization. Much
depreciation is also unrelated to utilization, because it reflects technological
obsolescence or exposure to the elements, rather than the direct effects of wear and
tear related to utilization.12 13
Since the aggregate annual user cost of holding the existing stock of capital is
largely unrelated to utilization, and since the growth rate of capital inputs are
basically acyclical in Table 2, the economy experiences rising output per unit of
capital and rising TFP as it comes out of a recession. As aggregate output goes up,
unit costs go down, principally because the largely fixed costs of holding capital are
spread over a larger flow volume of output. Procyclical TFP is not simply a statistical
artifact produced by failure to make an adequate utilization adjustment to capital
input. It is real and economically meaningful.
4. Aggregate Supply and the Cyclical Behavior of TFP
If in fact the growth rate of TFP has behaved procyclically in the United States,
there remain differences over how this is to be explained. Real business cycle theory
provides an alternate account. RBC theorists view business cycles as “small
deviations in trend” of real output (Kehoe and Prescott, 2008, p. 11), and they view
productivity shocks, defined as deviations from a detrended TFP series, as the

impulses causing the cycles (Prescott, 1986). Rather than demand shocks causing
short run TFP movements, and this being something one can test empirically, TFP is
by definition procyclical.
RBC pioneers such as Lucas and Prescott initially granted that their approach
was not applicable to major macroeconomic disruptions such as the Great
Depression.14 But Prescott subsequently changed his mind, influenced, according to
his own account, by the work of Harold Cole and Lee Ohanian (de Vroey and
Pensieoroso, 2006). RBC research has now merged into a broader umbrella known as
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) analysis, which includes
neoKeynesian variants.
A unifying precept in RBC modeling is that sources of measured productivity
change, in both the short and long run, lie outside of economics – in the realm of
politics or in an independent dynamic of technological advance. If there is a unifying
feature of the broader DSGE program, it is the insistence on providing strong
microeconomic foundations for macroeconomic relationships, which has always
seemed to me more of an aesthetic preference than a scientific imperative. That said,
many DSGE models escape from the narrow strictures of the original RBC initiative.
Some adopt features of macroeconomic research from over half a century ago,
exploring the influence of monetary or fiscal policy shocks within the context of nonmarket clearing imperfections, and returning to an empirical strategy relying on the
estimation of structural equations rather than calibration (Woodford, 2009).
Cole and Ohanian, however, see their work as still very much within the
original RBC tradition, and the assumption that short run TFP fluctuations are

exogenous is part of their maintained hypothesis. This is true as well for the broader
Great Depressions project run by Timothy Kehoe and Edward Prescott at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.15 For the contributors to Kehoe and Prescott (2007),
the source of the large drops in TFP associated with depressions is to be found in
technological regress, or, in the absence of plausible candidates, in bad government
supply side policies.
In contrast, the view advanced here is that cycles are caused principally by
aggregate demand fluctuations, with the output gap as proxied by the unemployment
rate reflecting the strength of negative demand shocks.16 TFP declined with
recession and depression because as the output gap widened, output fell, but capital
inputs and costs generally didn’t.
These approaches involve different understandings of the primary causes of
business cycles, differences highlighted in the competing principles used by the
NBER’s Business Cycle committee in its ex post dating of cycles. The committee
places “substantial weight” on movements in real GDP but acknowledges that one
can also look at the output gap in which case the unemployment rate would be a
“critical guide.”17 An RBC perspective leads one to put most weight on the former
criterion, and indeed some have suggested that cycles can be dated mechanically, and
a committee is not needed.
A challenge for the RBC approach, however, is to provide plausible historical
narratives consistent with the periodic and often substantial declines in TFP
associated with recessions. Variations in the arrival rate of innovations might account
for alterations in a positive rate of growth of TFP, but it is more difficult to see how

such variations would periodically cause it to go negative.18 Data for the years 1890
through 2004 indicate an average annual rate of private non-farm TFP growth of 1.46
percent with a standard deviation of over 4 percentage points. There are many years
in which TFP didn’t just grow more slowly, it declined, often sharply (see Figure 1).
(FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE)
For 1948 and earlier, average annual TFP growth was 1.7 percent per year and
the standard deviation was 5.4 percent. TFP declined in 23 of the 58 years: 1893,
1894, 1896, 1898, 1902, 1904, 1907, 1908, 1910, 1912, 1914, 1917, 1920, 1922,
1925, 1927, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1944, 1946, and 1947. On the face of it, it
seems unlikely that all of these declines can be attributed to negative technological
shocks or, absent that, innovations in bad government supply side policy, with the
implied counterfactual that within a minimalist state they would not have occurred.
The most striking and problematic declines prior to the Second World War take place
in 1930, 1931, 1932 and 1933 in the context of the most serious output shortfall in
U.S. economic history. 12 percentage points of the more than 30 percent drop in real
output between 1929 and 1933 is attributable to downward movement in TFP.
In understanding what happened during these years, we have well established
narratives detailing the effects of collapsing banks, a shrinking money supply, the
interactions of debt and deflation, and plummeting velocity due to declines in
spending on consumer durables and investment goods (Bernanke, 1983, Eichengreen,
1992; Field, 1984; Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Romer, 1990; Temin, 1976).19
These accounts differ in terms of their relative emphasis on national and international

factors, or on monetary vs. velocity shocks, but they reflect a shared view that the
Great Depression was principally the consequence of aggregate demand shocks.
Lee Ohanian (2009) has suggested that a meeting with President Hoover in
November of 1929 persuaded industrialists to maintain high real wages in
manufacturing, and that this explains part of the shrinkage in that sector through
1931. Much of the drop took place in durables and there is considerable evidence that
overextended, overindebted, and uncertain consumers cut back sharply on this
category of their spending (Mishkin, 1978; Romer, 1990). To this can be added the
decline in orders attributable to the drop in the producer durables portion of
investment expenditure.20 These should be considered the primary causes of the drop
in manufacturing up through the banking crisis of October 1931. At best, a failure of
nominal wages to decline faster can be seen as an institutional factor contributing to
the nonneutrality of a negative aggregate demand shock.
Moreover, a more rapid decline in nominal wages in manufacturing – Ohanian’s
posited counterfactual – would have worsened the debt deflation problem.

There is

nothing in the modeling to capture the threat posed to output and employment by
deflation in a world in which most borrowing and lending involved instruments with
fixed nominal repayment obligations. There are many institutional features of an
economy that can contribute to nonneutrality, and, as both our historical and current
experience with financial fragility indicates, it is far from clear that the most
significant of these are in the labor market.
The other shocks emphasized by Cole and Ohanian, such as the National
Industrial Recovery Act or the National Labor Relations Act, all took place after

1933, during a period of very rapid TFP growth (see Figure 1). At best they could
account for why TFP growth wasn’t even faster. They could not have played a role in
the cumulative 12 percent decline in TFP under President Hoover.
Russian/Soviet GDP and, presumably, TFP, declined sharply after 1913 and did
not reattain its prewar level until 1926. But an historical narrative can point to large
negative supply shocks, including the disastrous participation of the Russians in the
First World War, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (which reduced Russian territory), the
March 1917 Revolution, the October 1917 Bolshevik revolution, the Civil War
between the Reds and the Whites, foreign intervention, and the political turmoil
associated with the death of Lenin and the rise of Stalin.21 We lack such a narrative
for the productivity declines during the worst years of the Depression. The most
plausible explanation for TFP declines during this period – and most others -- is that
demand shocks widened the output gap, and as the output gap widened, output fell,
while capital input and cost largely didn’t.
For the 1948-2004 period, average TFP growth is lower and less variable. The
mean growth rate is 1.4 percent with a standard deviation of 1.8 percent. The reduced
cyclical volatility of TFP during this period is arguably because cycles were weaker,
at least between the 1982 recession and the 2007-09 downturn. In the quarter century
prior to 2008, the U.S. economy experienced only two relatively minor recessions.
Even with a lower ratio of standard deviation to mean, however, the level of TFP, not
just its rate of growth, declined in 1954, 1956, 1969, 1970, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1981,
1982, and 1991.

For the postwar period, however, there is a plausible source of negative supply
shocks, particularly between 1972 and 1985. Sharp increases in the price of oil
resulting from political decisions made by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries produced deteriorations in the efficiency of the machine (foreign trade)
whereby the United States transformed wheat, soybeans, plywood and aircraft into
oil. Prior to mid century, when the U.S. was still the world’s largest oil producer, oil
shocks are of little relevance in understanding the aggregate economy. And, in part
because of controls, there is relatively little change in the real price of a barrel of
crude oil from the end of the Second World War through 1970. Between December
1973 and January 1974, however, the price more than doubled as a direct
consequence of OPEC actions. And in April of 1979, the price began rapidly rising.
Following a peak in April of 1980, at which point it had more than doubled from a
year earlier, it began a steady decline before bottoming out in 1985. Aside from a
brief spike during the first Gulf War, it then remained relatively steady until after
2005.
(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE)
Table 3 reports an additional regression for the post war period. The dependent
variable, as in Table 1, is the rate of change of TFP. Equation 3.1 adds the level of
real oil prices in 2008 dollars to the change in the unemployment rate on the right
hand side. This regression shows that oil prices do have a negative impact on TFP
growth rates. But the size of its coefficient is quite small, and not statistically
significant. Independently of fluctuations in the output gap, a $10 increase in the real

price of a barrel of crude subtracts less than a quarter of a percentage point from the
TFP growth rate.
It is commonly argued that, in contrast with 1980 or 1981-82, the 1974-75
recession was made in Vienna and Riyadh, rather than Washington. It was 1974-75,
after all, that turned the Philips curve into an unidentified flying object. Still, the
Federal Funds rate, which was under 5 percent as late as September 1972, was more
than twice that a year later, and remained above 10 percent between July 1973 and
November of 1973 and then again between April and October of 1974. The role that
monetary stringency played in inducing this recession has been perhaps underplayed.
It was clearly implicated in the decline in investment spending which marked this
recession as well as so many others.
The proportional increase in the real price of oil was larger in 1979-80 than
what occurred between December of 1973 and January of 1974, although its
disruptive impact was less because, as a consequence of the first oil price shock, the
U.S. economy had begun moving towards a more energy efficient capital stock. A
review of the sequence of oil price, interest rate, and unemployment rate movements
between 1979 and 1982 helps explain why, in spite of the second oil price shock, the
recessions of 1980 and 1981-82 are almost universally attributed to changes in
aggregate demand conditions resulting from the tightening of monetary policy
engineered by Chairman Volcker to fight inflation.
(FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE)
Even before the real price of oil began its year long upward movement in April
of 1979, the Federal Funds rate began a climb into historically unprecedented

territory. Following the seven month period in 1974 when it had exceeded 10
percent, the rate declined to a trough in January of 1977 at 4.71 percent, then began a
gradual upward movement. In December of 1978 it broke 10 percent again, hit 11.4
percent in September of 1979, and then 13.8 percent in October, when Chairman
Volcker announced a new monetary regime in which the Fed would target monetary
aggregates, and allow the funds rate to seek its own level. By April of 1980 the rate
had increased to an eye-popping 17.61 percent.
Unemployment began to rise sharply, from 6.3 percent in March of 1980 to a
peak of 7.8 percent in July. Concerned that the unprecedented monetary stringency
would take the real economy into a major recession, the Fed relented, slashing the
funds rate by almost half to a low of 9 percent in July of 1980. In reaction to
monetary easing, the unemployment rate stopped rising, and remained in a range of
7.2-7.6 percent through September of 1981.
In the meantime, however, reconsidering the impact of its easing on inflationary
expectations in both the bond and labor markets, the Fed again allowed the funds rate
to move upward. It reached a new and unprecedented peak of 19.1 percent in January
of 1981. The rate dropped to 14 percent in April but then rose again to 19.1 percent
in June. In July of 1981 the unemployment rate began a relentless year and a half rise
to a peak of 10.8 percent in November and December of 1982, as of this writing still
the highest unemployment rate experienced since the Great Depression.
Economists such as Robert Lucas, pioneers of rational expectations modeling,
had predicted that we could have costless disinflation but were proved wrong. The
rise in the unemployment rate from 7.2 percent in July of 1981 to its peak of 10.8

percent a year and a half later can’t be attributed to negative supply shocks. The real
price of oil had been declining steadily since April of 1980. The level of total factor
productivity dropped .7 percent in 1979, 2.2 percent in 1980, .4 percent in 1981, and
3.6 percent in 1982.
With the possible exception of 1974-75, the most serious economic downturns
of the twentieth century were precipitated by aggregate demand shocks. In most
instances it is the linkage running from aggregate demand to the output gap that
generates the negative TFP movements associated with recession.

5. Conclusion
Receptivity to procyclical TFP as a stylized feature of US growth has been
influenced by macroeconomic theorists placing greater emphasis on aggregate supply,
and by empirical investigations involving relatively short data runs usually limited to
the manufacturing sector. The regressions discussed in sections 1 and 2 cover more
than a century, and are broad in coverage, examining data for the U.S. private
nonfarm economy, which has typically accounted for about three fourths of GDP (the
declining share of agriculture and the rising share of government have kept the PNE
share roughly stable). Manufacturing has contributed a declining share of U.S. GDP,
particularly since the 1970s. Even at its high point in the mid-century decades, that
share barely exceeded a third, and today it contributes less than a sixth..22 Although
data for the sector is more detailed than that available for the rest of the economy,
trends within the sector do not necessarily offer an accurate guide to what is
happening in the economy as a whole.

These regressions show that although labor productivity is weakly procyclical,
approaching acyclicality after 1973, there is a stable and systematic relationship
between the business cycle, as manifested in the unemployment rate, and total factor
productivity that has endured for over a century. A decline of one percentage point in
the unemployment rates adds about .9 percent to the TFP growth rate, irrespective of
whether the trend growth rate is fast or slow.
The paper rejects the argument of Shapiro and others that the TFP findings are a
statistical artifact. It explains procyclicality as resulting principally from demand
shocks interacting with capital services which are relatively invariant over the cycle.
The gains in total factor productivity as one comes out of a recession are real. They
represent short run increasing returns to scale, as hotels, warehouses, transportation
systems and other capital assets experience higher load factors.
Real business cycle models provide an alternate account of procyclicality, in
which deviations in TFP from trend are cause, not consequence if business cycles.
But RBC proponents have difficulty providing compelling narratives consistent with
the observation that TFP often declines during recessions, rather than simply
experiencing growth retardation.
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Table 1
Dependent Variable: ∆TFP a
Eq. No.

Years

n

Constant

(1.1)

1929-41

12

.0283

- .0092

(3.02)

(-4.28)

.0197

- .0091

(2.83)

(-4.45)

.0175

- .0091

(2.65)

(-4.52)

.0166

- .0084

(2.75)

(-4.77)

.0165

- .0103

(2.68)

(-4.38)

.0195

- .0082

(6.51)

(-3.16)

.0053

- .0098

(1.57)

(-3.14)

.0129

- .0083

(6.08)

(-4.11)

.0148

- .0084

(4.59)

(-6.65)

.0148

- .0100

(4.50)

(-6.14)

.0105

- .0087

.0006

(1.79)

(-6.64)

(.889)

(1.2)
(1.3)
(1.4)
(1.5)
(1.6)
(1.7)
(1.8)
(1.9)
(1.10)
(1.11)

1900-41
1900-48
1890-1948
1890-1948d
1948-73
1973-95
1948-2004
1890-2004
1890-2004e
1890-2004

41
48
58
58
26
23
56
114
114
114

∆UR b

UR c

R2
.647
.337
.307
.289
.255
.294
.319
.235
.283
.252
.288

Note: t statistics in parentheses.
a

∆TFP is the difference in the natural log of TFP from one year to the next. It is thus

a measure of the continuously compounded annual rate of increase of total factor
productivity.

b

∆UR is the change in the unemployment rate in percentage points from year t-1 to

year t.
c

UR is the level of the unemployment rate in year t.

d

Uses Weir rather than Lebergott unemployment data

e

Uses Weir unemployment data through 1948, BLS thereafter.

Sources and notes. All data are for the private nonfarm economy. The convention is
to calculate the 1947-48 growth rate from historical data (Kendrick, Lebergott, or
Weir) and to calculate the 1948-49 growth rate from Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
Each growth rate is calculated as the change in the natural log from year t-1 to year t.
The dependent variables are therefore logged and differenced, mitigating
autocorrelation problems; Durbin-Watson statistics are within acceptable ranges. The
change in the unemployment rate is the change in percentage points between year t-1
and year t.
Total Factor Productivity data for 1890-1948 are from Kendrick (1961, Table AXXIII); data for 1948-2004 are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Net Multifactor
Productivity and Cost, 1948-2008, SIC 1948-87 linked to NAICS 1987-2008” release
of May 6, 2009. Variant 1 of the unemployment rate for 1890-1948 is from
Lebergott (1964) and variant 2 for 1890-1948 is from Weir (1992). The
unemployment rates for 1948-2004 comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
“Employment Status of the Civilian Noninstitutional Population. 1940 to Date,”
available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat1.pdf , accessed on August 14, 2009.

Table 2
Dependent Variable: ∆Y/N
∆UR

R2

.0210

- .0052

.139

(3.58)

(-3.01)

.0253

- .0060

(8.68)

(-2.37)

.0154

- .0028

(5.69)

(-1.12)

.0203

- .0051

(6.48)

(-4.15)

Eq. No.

Years

n

Constant

(2.1)

1890-1948

58

(2.2)
(2.3)
(2.4)

1948-73
1973-2004
1890-2004

26
32
114

.189
.009
.133

Dependent Variable: ∆K/N
Eq. No.

Years

n

Constant

∆UR

R2

(2.5)

1948-2004

56

.0275

.0190

.727

(16.65)

(2.6)
(2.7)
(2.8)

1890-1948
1900-41
1890-2004

58
41
114

(12.10)

.0121

.0147

(3.02)

(12.57)

.0073

.0162

(1.67)

(12.68)

.0195

.0151

(8.49)

(16.70)

.738
.805
.713

Dependent Variable: ∆N
Eq. No.

Years

n

Constant

(2.9)

1890-1948

58

.0163
(7.53)

(2.10)

1948-2004

56

.0164
(14.18)

(2.11)

1890-2004

114

.0163
(7.53)

∆UR

R2

- .0152

.741

(-17.88)

- .0213

.872

(-19.36)

- .0152
(-17.88)

..741

Dependent Variable: ∆K
Eq. No.

Years

n

(2.12)

1890-2004

114

Constant
.0346
(18.08)

(2.13)

1948-2004

56

.0416
(27.93)

(2.14)

1890-48

58

∆UR

R2

- .0001

.000

(-.167)

- .0029

.071

(-2.04)

.0283

- .0001

(8.62)

(-.115)

.000

Dependent Variable: ∆Y/K
Eq. No.

Years

n

(2.15)

1890-2004

114

(2.16)

1948-2004

56

Constant

∆UR

R2

.0020

- .0200

.654

(0.61)

(-14.52)

-.0052
(-.2.00)

(2.17)

1890-48

58

- .0212

.579

(-8.70)

.0090

- .0199

(1.41)

(-10.68)

.671

Dependent Variable: ∆Y
Eq. No.

Years

n

(2.18)

1890-2004

114

(2.19)

1948-2004

56

Constant

∆UR

R2

.0366

-.0203

.690

(11.20)

(-15.81)

.0361
(18.38)

(2.20)

1890-48

58

- .02458

.777

(-13.84)

.0373

- .0198

(6.09)

(-11.01)

.684

Sources and notes: ∆Y, ∆N and ∆K are defined as the change in the natural log of
output, hours, and capital input respectively between year t-1 and year t. They are
thus a measure of the continuously compounded growth rate of these variables from
one year to the next. ∆Y/N is the difference between the growth rate of output and
the growth rate of hours; it is thus a measure of the growth rate of labor productivity.
∆K/N is the difference between the growth rate of capital and the growth rate of
hours; it measures the growth of the capital-labor ratio. ∆Y/K is the difference
between the growth rate of output and the growth rate of capital. It measures of the
growth rate of capital productivity (the inverse of the capital output ratio). ∆UR is the
change in the unemployment rate measured in percentage points
Data for real output, capital services, and labor hours for the private non-farm
economy for 1890-1948 are from Kendrick, 1961, Table A-XXIII; for 1948-2004,
they are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Net Multifactor Productivity and Cost,
1948-2008, SIC 1948-87 linked to NAICS 1987-2008,” release of May 6, 2009.

Table.3

Dependent Variable: ∆TFP
Eq. No.

Years

n

Constant

∆UR

(3.1)

1946-2004

58

.0185

- .0098

(3.82)

(-4.48)

Oil

R2

-.00021 .303
(-1.62)

Sources: ∆TFP and ∆UR: See Table 1
Oil: Real Price of a barrel of Crude Oil, annual data. Deflation is based on
the Consumer Price Index, urban. Values are in November 2008 dollars.
http://www.inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.as
p , accessed October 24, 2009.
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Figure 2
Real Oil Price, Federal Funds Rate, and the Civilian Unemployment Rate, 1978-85
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Figure 2
Sources: Monthly Real Oil Price. Nominal is Spot Oil Price, West Texas Intermediate,
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/OILPRICE , accessed October 24, 2009.
Deflator is CPI-U, Seasonally Adjusted, 1982-84 =100, http://www.bea.gov,
accessed October 24, 2009. Plotted data are half the values in 1982-4 dollars.
Federal Funds rate: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/FEDFUNDS.txt , accessed
October 24, 2009. Left hand scale is percent
Civilian Unemployment rate, seasonally adjusted: http://www.bls.gov , accessed October
24, 2009. Left hand scale is percent.

FOOTNOTES
1

These conclusions are robust to substituting the pre-1948 unemployment series

generated by Weir (1992) for the Lebergott numbers which continue to be used by most
researchers.
2

In the text, coefficient estimates are multiplied by 100 so they can be interpreted in

percent per year terms.
3

Personal communication from Paul David, November 2, 2008.

4

Kehoe and Prescott “hypothesize that the growth rate [in the stock of knowledge] is two

percent per year” (2008, p. 10). Their estimate is roughly half a percentage point higher
than the estimates of 1.5 percent per year suggested by the constant terms in the 18902004 regressions in equations 1.9-1.11 in Table 1.
5

A JSTOR search shows almost all articles referencing the phenomenon appearing after

1995.
6

Basu and Fernald , for example, take it as a given that both TFP and labor productivity

are procyclical. “Productivity is procyclical. That is, whether measured as labor
productivity or total factor productivity, productivity rises in booms and falls in
recessions” (2000, p. 1). Data for the private nonfarm economy, however, show labor
productivity approaching acyclicality after 1973 (see Table 2). The more robust empirical
regularity is the procyclicality of TFP.
7

The simple correlation between the unemployment rate and the BEA’s chain type

quantity index for investment in private fixed asset (Table 6.8 in the Fixed Asset Tables,
available at http://www.bea.gov, accessed on August 16, 2009) is -.14.

40

8

Capital shallowing, the opposite of deepening, refers to situations in which the capital-

labor ratio declines.
9

This second effect applies equally to variable capital: the holding costs of a stock of

wholesale or retail inventory is invariant to how frequently it turns over. For a similar
analysis, which places more emphasis on the market power which is the logical
concomitant of large fixed capital installations, see Hall (1988). See also Field (1987).
10

Basu and Fernald (2000, p. 35)) also make utilization adjustments that reduce the

procyclicality of TFP. Their adjustments, designed to correct for utilization of both labor
and capital, are based on sectoral data on changes in hours worked per worker, combined
with the assumption that these data proxy both for unmeasured changes in the intensity of
work and the “workweek of capital” (flow of capital services). The adjustment
applicable to capital is, however, too large. The capital stock is dominated by structures,
and the service flow contributed by a warehouse or hotel is largely invariant to how full
or empty they are, let alone to how many hours employees within them work.
11

In spite of a rise in the share of equipment, structures remain dominant today within the

US private fixed asset stock, as they were throughout the twentieth century. In 2007,
total private fixed assets comprised $33.4 trillion, with equipment and software totaling
only $5.3 trillion. Nonresidential structures accounted for $10.2 trillion; the remainder
was residential structures. http://www.bea.gov, Fixed Asset Table 2.1 accessed June 22,
2009. For historical data, see Field (1985).
12

Hall, 1988, p. 923, makes a similar assumption about depreciation.

13

The rate of deterioration (depreciation) of a tar and gravel roof on a warehouse is

independent of how much is stored inside it.
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14

“…the Great Depression [. . . ] remains a formidable barrier to a completely unbending

application of the view that business cycles are all alike” (Lucas, 1980, p. 273). RBC
theorists have also had little to say about the 2007-10 financial crisis and recession.
15

De Cordoba and Kehoe (2009, p. 2) summarize the contributions of Kehoe and Prescott

(2007).: “The authors of each of the studies … start by decomposing the decline in
output during the depression into declines in inputs of labor and capital and a decline in
the efficiency with which these factors are employed, measured as productivity. They
find that a large drop in productivity always plays a large role in accounting for the
depression.” “Accounting for” means here more than simply contributing to in an
arithmetical sense. It means causing. Most economists are comfortable with this
interpretation for long term analysis. The differences involve its applicability to short
term cyclical fluctuations.
16

The rationale is the close and systematic relationship between the unemployment rate

and the output gap, first identified by Arthur Okun and known colloquially as Okun’s
Law (Okun, 1962).
17

In its document “The NBER Business Cycle Dating Procedures”, the Bureau

committee responsible for dating cycles notes: “While the NBER has traditionally placed
substantial weight on output measures, one could instead define expansions and
recessions in terms of whether the fraction of the economy’s productive resources that is
being used is rising or falling (in which case the behavior of the unemployment rate
would be a critical guide to whether the economy was in expansion or recession), or in
terms of whether the quantity of productive resources being used was rising or falling (in
which case employment would be a critical indicator). Either of these alternative

42

definitions is defensible…” In response to a FAQ about the 2001 recession, and why
more emphasis was not placed on trends in the unemployment rate and employment in
determining its end, the document simply states that to have dated it in this fashion would
have been “inconsistent with the procedures it had used to date earlier recessions” (Hall
et. al, 2003, p. 7).
18

As Rebelo (2005, p. 9) has written, “Macroeconomists generally agree that expansions

in output, at least in the medium to long run, are driven by TFP increases that derive from
technical progress. In contrast, the notion that recessions are caused by TFP declines
meets with substantial skepticism because, interpreted literally, it means that recessions
are times of technological regress.”
19

The literature is voluminous; these references are illustrative. .

20

In nominal terms investment in producer durables dropped by more than half between

1929 and 1931 ($5.5 to $2.6 billion). Consumption spending on durables dropped 40
percent, from $9.8 to $5.5 billion. Spending on nondurables dropped less than a quarter
and on services less than 15 percent. http://www.bea.gov, NIPA Table 1.1.5, accessed
October 25, 2009.
21

For other examples of negative TFP growth, see Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2006).

22

Manufacturing’s share of national income averaged 30.6 percent between 1941 and

1960. The share declined modestly in the 1960s and then more rapidly beginning in the
1970s (Carter et al., 2006, Series Ca35 and Ca41).
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